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Introduction 
 
Some people are impressively skilled. Skilled individuals can do various things that many of us 
cannot. For example, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Bo Jackson was one of the premier 
athletes in the world, excelling as both an especially agile Major League Baseball centerfielder 
and the leading running back in the National Football League. Faced with a ten-foot wall 
blocking his path, Bo knew how to scale it. Confronted with a ten-foot wall, one of the options 
available to Bo was to climb over it and move on to the next athletic challenge or Nike 
commercial shoot. For most of us, however, climbing such a wall with only our hands, legs, and 
brute strength would not appear as an option. Climbing the wall would appear in Bo’s menu of 
options, but not in either of the present co-authors’ menus of options, for example. More 
generally, climbing the wall would be ranked in a different position in Bo’s menu of options than 
in the menus of anyone who believed themselves insufficiently athletic to scale it. Differences in 
the rank placement of this option across distinct individuals, we contend, are due to the different 
epistemic burdens that various individuals take themselves to face in pursuing this option.  
Scheall (2019) defines the epistemic burden of some objective as “simply everything that 
the actor must know (that and how), which the actor does not already know, in order to realize 
the objective deliberately as a result of related actions directed to its realization, i.e., not 
spontaneously, or otherwise in virtue of luck or fortune.” Epistemic burdens thus encompass 
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both propositional and non-propositional knowledge (or, more exactly, ignorance).1 Epistemic 
burdens pre-consciously shape our incentive structures.2 Courses of action that seem to bear 
impossibly heavy epistemic burdens are typically not counted as options in the menu over which 
an actor deliberates and from which she eventually makes a conscious choice, while courses of 
action that seem to bear comparatively heavy epistemic burdens are systematically discounted in 
                                                        
1 Epistemic burdens, Scheall (2019, 47 fn 5) further notes, are “relative to both knowers and their 
potential objectives. Epistemic burdens are always relative to some actor with respect to some 
goal.” 
 
[A]ctors can evaluate their epistemic burdens with regard to various objectives with some 
facility, but not necessarily infallibly. Thus, epistemic burdens encompass both “known 
unknowns,” i.e., considerations that the actor knows he does not know, and “unknown 
unknowns” that the actor cannot evaluate in advance of action. 
Epistemic burdens should not be conflated with epistemic costs. Rather, epistemic 
costs are incurred in the process of attempting to overcome epistemic burdens. Indeed, 
epistemic costs need not track epistemic burdens very closely. Just as one might climb a 
mountain of a given height in a more or less circuitous fashion and incur greater or lesser 
physical costs in the process, there can be more or less epistemically costly ways in 
which a given epistemic burden might be met.  
 
2 We use the phrases “incentive structure,” “menu of options,” and “preference ranking” 
interchangeably to mean the array of courses of action from which an actor ultimately makes a 
decision. We also use the terms “actor” and “decision-maker” interchangeably. 
The Priority of the Epistemic 
 
 3 
the actor’s menu relative to options that appear less epistemically burdensome. Ignorance shapes 
the psychology of decision-making. Furthermore, that ignorance shapes the psychology of 
decision-making in the way that we posit means that epistemic considerations are logically prior 
to moral, prudential, and pecuniary considerations. In order to have moral, prudential, or 
pecuniary obligations, one must have options, and epistemic burdens – the nature and extent of 
one’s ignorance (that and how) with respect to various courses of action – both bracket one’s 
options and serve to determine where surviving options are ranked. In short, one cannot have 
obligations without doing some epistemic work, even if, as we posit, such work typically occurs 
pre-consciously.  
In the first section, we further defend the claim that ignorance brackets and serves to 
determine the initial ranking of options. We argue that introspection indicates the reality of the 
phenomena. We also examine how the fact of pre-conscious filtering of options for the decision-
maker’s ignorance bears distinct consequences in cases of personal and surrogate decision-
making. The logical priority of the epistemic is general across all varieties of decision-making; 
however, the unique epistemology of surrogate cases makes this priority more apparent.  
In the subsequent section, we offer a second argument for the priority of the epistemic. 
Many people, including most philosophers, believe that ought implies can or some similar, but 
logically weaker, principle like ought supports can or ought makes plausible can. Few would 
accept that there is no connection whatsoever between what one can do and what one ought to 
do. In any case, it is not our business to take a stance on whether ought and can are bound by 
implication or some weaker logical relation. We argue instead that, whatever version of such a 
principle one accepts, if it is to have any significance as a practical maxim – if it is to help us get 
around in the world without bumping into the furniture – the word “can” in such principles must 
mean deliberately can. Other candidate meanings of “can” make such principles trivial and 
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practically useless. However, we argue further that “deliberately can” ultimately means knows 
enough (that and how) to. Thus, whether one accepts ought implies can or a weaker version of a 
principle with similar import, one is ultimately committed to the notion that it is the nature and 
extent of one’s ignorance, i.e., the epistemic burdens one confronts with respect to various 
courses of action, that determine one’s potential moral, prudential, and pecuniary oughts. In 
other words, provided one accepts something like ought implies can, one is committed to the 
logical priority of the epistemic.  
 
Ignorance and Menu Options 
 
The question that we want to answer in the present section is, what considerations determine 
whether a course of action counts as an option for an actor? Our answer is that epistemic 
considerations, in particular, the nature and extent of one’s ignorance with respect to various 
courses of action, determine options. If it is true that one must have options to have obligations 
and that epistemic considerations determine options, then the epistemic is logically prior to 
obligations, be they moral, prudential, pecuniary, or otherwise normative in some (non-
epistemic) sense.   
Simple introspection shows that things about which one is seemingly completely ignorant 
– i.e., things that seem to bear impossibly heavy epistemic burdens – typically do not appear to 
the actor as options, and that the nature and extent of one’s ignorance with regard to particular 
options serves to determine where the remaining options are initially ranked when first 
consciously considered. When a person’s vehicle breaks down and the person is entirely ignorant 
of vehicle repair, do-it-yourself car repair either does not appear as an option at all or is 
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systematically discounted relative to the option of taking the car to the reliable and honest 
mechanic down the street.  
In any particular decision context, the menu of options from which we choose when 
planning a course of action seems to arrive in consciousness pre-sorted for our ignorance. When 
considering, say, what to have for lunch, what film to see, or what mode of travel to adopt, it 
rarely, if ever, happens that options enter these menus which we think impossible on the basis of 
our existing knowledge, powers, abilities, skills (and our capacities for learning new knowledge, 
acquiring new powers, etc). We do not consider as options seemingly impossible lunches, 
apparently impossible films, or ostensibly impossible modes of travel. We consider as options 
only things that we believe (if only un- or sub-consciously) we either know or can learn enough 
to do. More generally, it rarely happens that options judged to bear a comparatively heavy 
epistemic burden are initially ranked higher in these menus than less epistemically burdensome 
courses of action.3 Other things equal, we do not rank epistemically difficult lunches, films, or 
modes of travel above epistemically simple ones. If we do not believe that we know or can learn 
what we need to realize some option, we either exclude it from or deeply discount it in our menu 
of options. We either do not consciously consider or do not take seriously courses of action that, 
on an evaluation of the knowledge we possess and our capacity to learn, seem epistemically 
impossible, or especially burdensome. 
Cases of surrogate decision-making, where one party decides on behalf and ostensibly in 
the interests of some other party, exhibit the significance of pre-conscious filtering for ignorance 
                                                        
3 Thus, technically, it is not our ignorance per se, but how we evaluate our ignorance, that 
determines options. For a discussion of how first-order and second-order epistemic 
considerations interact to affect the pre-conscious sorting of options, see Scheall (2019, 44-45). 
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more starkly than do cases of personal decision-making, where one decides for oneself. A sane 
person will never permit a seemingly impossible option to enter her menu and will discount 
epistemically burdensome options accordingly. However, no such guarantee exists where one 
person must decide on behalf and in the interests of some other. Simply put, there is no guarantee 
in such cases that the surrogate knows the options in the interests of the other party or how to 
achieve them. You will never leave yourself an option that you cannot know enough to achieve, 
but a person on whose behalf you must decide might assign such an option to you.4  
A bit more carefully, in trying to decide on behalf and in the interests of another person, 
the surrogate’s epistemic burden potentially consists of two elements. First, the surrogate faces 
the burden of knowing the person’s interests and the various options associated with these 
interests. In principle, a similar burden exists in cases of personal decision-making; however, 
introspection typically suffices to discover one’s own interests, while pre-conscious filtering 
reveals a limited range of options associated with these interests seemingly deliberately 
realizable given the nature and extent of one’s ignorance. The epistemic burden of discovering 
one’s own interests, etc., would seem to be necessarily lighter than the comparatively heavy 
burden of discovering someone else’s interests and the options relevant to them.5 Second, given 
knowledge of the person’s interests, the surrogate confronts another potential epistemic burden 
in acquiring adequate knowledge of means sufficient to realize relevant options. Even if the 
surrogate knows the interests of the person on whose behalf she decides, as well as the options 
                                                        
4 On the effects of ignorance on the surrogate decision-maker’s incentive structure, see 
Crutchfield and Scheall (2019).  
5 Crutchfield and Scheall (2019) provide both epistemological and psychological explanations of 
this phenomenon. 
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associated with these interests, she may not know of a way to effectively pursue these options 
such that the relevant interests are satisfied.  
In short, pre-conscious filtering cannot prevent impossible or especially epistemically 
burdensome options in the case of surrogate decision-making: the option most in the interest of 
the person on whose behalf the surrogate decides may well be epistemically impossible or more 
epistemically burdensome for the surrogate than alternative courses of action less in the interests 
of the person on whose behalf a decision must be made. The point is that the surrogate’s 
preference ranking will be determined by her own ignorance and not by the ignorance of the 
person on whose behalf she decides. The surrogate’s menu of options need look nothing like the 
menu from which the person surrogated would choose, were the latter to choose for herself.  
 In order to undermine this argument from introspection, one would have to provide a 
counterexample that falsifies our analysis of the determination and ranking of options according 
to the actor’s ignorance. A case in which a course of action about which the actor is entirely 
ignorant nevertheless appears to her as an option would be a counterexample to our argument. 
Instances of spontaneous inspiration might appear to be counterexamples to our analysis. For 
example, the person entirely ignorant of vehicle repair might spontaneously think, “I could fix it 
myself!” Without a specific case at hand, it is hard to know how one would respond to such an 
example. However, it seems open to us to claim of such a case that something must have 
happened to make the actor more knowledgeable about this course of action. Perhaps the actor 
witnessed a neighbor changing their own motor oil or saw a sign for a DIY vehicle-repair 
training program, triggering the thought that they could fix the vehicle themselves. No longer 
completely ignorant of DIY vehicle repair, the option appears in their menu (albeit, significantly 
discounted relative to less epistemically burdensome options). 
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 Another kind of counterexample to our analysis would be a case in which an option that 
bears a heavier epistemic burden is nevertheless ranked above another option that bears a lighter 
burden, even though they are equivalent in other respects, i.e., it would be a case in which ceteris 
is paribus, but options are not pre-ranked in the way we posit.6 It would not be enough to present 
a case in which a person chooses an option that bears a heavier epistemic burden over some other 
less burdensome option. Other considerations, such as the moral, prudential, or pecuniary value 
of competing options, figure in decision-making. Sometimes people pursue options with 
comparatively heavy epistemic burdens, because they take the moral, prudential, or pecuniary 
value of these options to outweigh their epistemic burdens. What we claim is that epistemic 
burdens are decisive for the pre-conscious ranking of options and, where these other 
considerations are equal across options, for the choice ultimately made.7 
                                                        
6 An even more damaging counterexample would be a case in which one option, despite being 
both more burdensome and of lower value in other relevant respects is nevertheless ranked 
higher than another option both less burdensome and more valuable in other relevant respects. 
However, such a case would call into doubt not only our analysis but, seemingly, any attempt to 
think systematically about decision-making.  
7 It might be tempting to think that the fact that ceteris is rarely paribus in human decision-
making trivializes that part of our thesis concerning the potential decisiveness of epistemic 
burdens. However, such “other things equal” clauses are essential in all domains of inquiry. The 
laws of Newtonian mechanics carry such conditions, yet ceteris is rarely paribus in the physical 
world outside vacuum chambers. Similarly, nothing in the economy remains constant very long, 
yet the Law of Demand operates regardless. As we have put this point elsewhere, “were the price 
of tea to increase ten-fold, a person who objects to the use of ceteris paribus conditions in 
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The Practical Meaning of Ought Implies Can and Similar Principles 
 
There is another route to the conclusion that the epistemic is logically prior to the moral, 
prudential, or pecuniary. Many people accept either that ought implies can or accept some 
similar, but logically weaker principle. For example, Stuart Hampshire (1951) and R. M. Hare 
(1951, 1963) argue that ought presupposes can, while Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (1984) argues 
that ought conversationally implicates can.8 Other, still weaker, candidate propositions are 
                                                        
scholarly inquiry would nevertheless be inclined to buy less tea” (Crutchfield and Scheall 2019, 
6). Inquiry in the sciences and humanities cannot proceed without isolating causal factors and 
their specific effects on relevant phenomena.  
Perhaps more to the point, the fact that other conditions may not be constant does not 
mean that the underlying principle fails to operate, though it can make its operation more 
difficult to observe. From the fact that moral, prudential, pecuniary (etc.) considerations can 
sometimes outweigh epistemic burdens and that relatively burdensome options can be chosen for 
these reasons it does not follow that ignorance fails to affect the ranking of options in such cases; 
it just makes its effects more difficult to observe. This is part of the reason why we discuss cases 
of surrogate decision-making in the current context, i.e., to display the role of ignorance in 
determining and sorting options in starker relief. 
8 Others who defend ought presupposes can include Cooper (1966), Martin (2009), Besch 
(2011), and Driver (2011). Mizrahi (2015) denies ought presupposes can, but describes it as “the 
best candidate for a relation between ‘ought’ and ‘can’.” Others who defend ought 
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conceivable. Perhaps ought supports can or ought makes plausible can. It is not incumbent upon 
us to take a position on the correctness of any such principle; nothing in our argument for the 
logical priority of the epistemic hinges on implication (or any other particular relation) being the 
correct relation between ought and can. Our argument is simply that, if some such principle is 
both true and useful as a guide to practical action, then the epistemic is logically prior to other 
normative considerations. Anyone committed to such a principle, whether ought implies can or a 
weaker version, is also committed to the priority of the epistemic. 
Consider what the word “can” must mean in the statements of such principles, if they are 
not to be utterly trivial, i.e., if they are not to make every course of action a potential obligation, 
but effectively bracket legitimate oughts according to the criteria of cans. If such principles have 
any substance at all as guides to successful decision-making, the relevant sense of “can” cannot 
be anything like possibly can or can, with luck, but must be something closer to deliberately can.   
Ought implies possibly can means that every possibility is a potential obligation and that 
only impossibilities cannot be potential obligations. Of course, there are multiple senses of 
possibility – metaphysical, logical, physical, economic, legal, political, social, etc. – and if ought 
implies can means that ought implies possibly can, it is not obvious which sense of possibility is 
pertinent. More to the point, whatever sense of possibility might be relevant, it seems that the set 
of potential obligations cannot simply be the set of possibilities. If, say, the relevant sense is 
physical possibility, then, under appropriate circumstances, anything physically possible might 
be something one ought to do. But this is implausible. It is physically possible to voluntarily 
submit to a live flaying; but it is implausible that one should ever do this. It would seem that this 
                                                        
conversationally implicates can include Oppenheim (1987), Vallentyne (1989), Saka (2000), 
Littlejohn (2009), and Vogelstein (2012).  
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and many other physical possibilities cannot be things one ought to do, regardless of 
circumstances—they can never be, even merely potentially, obligations. On the other hand, if, 
say, the legal sense of possibility is relevant, then it seems that the set of potential obligations 
may well be larger than the set of possibilities. In other words, there may be legally impossible 
things (i.e., illegalities) which, nevertheless, one ought to do, under appropriate circumstances. It 
may be that a person ought to steal from a rich man to feed her starving family, though she 
cannot possibly do this legally. Given a particular sense of possibility, it seems that the set of 
potential obligations is not simply equivalent to the set of possibilities and, therefore, that 
possibly can cannot be the relevant sense of “can” in such principles.  
Alternatively, if ought implies can, with luck, then the principle is trivial and practically 
useless. If luck or fortune intervenes, virtually anything can happen. If this is the sense of “can” 
relevant to such principles, then anything that you can do, even if it requires the intervention of 
luck or of other spontaneous forces outside your purview, or beyond your control, is something 
that you potentially ought to do, under the right circumstances. In short, virtually anything is a 
potential ought, if ought implies can, with luck.  
However, there is another reason to reject this reading of “can.” Part of what it means for 
something to happen “fortunately” or “luckily” is that it happens for reasons, or in ways, that are 
not well understood or apparently under human control. “I just got (un)lucky” is how we often 
explain ex post facto personal circumstances that we do not understand and cannot explain 
otherwise. We are not very good at recognizing in advance where, when, or how luck or other 
spontaneous forces will intervene. If this is right, then ought implies can, with luck is worthless 
as a guide to successful decision-making. If you cannot distinguish the things that you cannot do, 
regardless of luck, from the things that you can do, with or without luck, then, if the relevant 
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meaning of “can” in such principles is can, with luck, then you cannot distinguish potential 
obligations from potential non-obligations, and any such principle is practically useless.  
If this is right, then it seems that the relevant sense of “can” in such principles must be 
closer to deliberately can. However, to say that someone deliberately can do something is just to 
say that they possess or can learn enough knowledge (that and how) to realize the thing without 
need for the intervention of luck, fortune, or any other spontaneous forces. What we deliberately 
can do depends on our existing knowledge and our capacity to acquire more knowledge. Stated 
another way, in order to realize an objective with regard to which our knowledge and learning 
capacity is inadequate, luck, fortune, or other spontaneous forces must intervene.  
It is important to emphasize that the conclusion of the logical priority of the epistemic, 
via this second dialectical route, hinges entirely on the notion that, in principles similar in 
relevant ways to those under investigation, “can” must mean deliberately can, which means 
knows enough (that and how) to, and not at all on an implicit assumption that implication is the 
appropriate relation between ought and can, in contravention of our explicit claim to assume 
nothing about the nature of this relation. One might be tempted to think that we need implication 
to be the appropriate relation, in order to draw the conclusion of the logical priority of the 
epistemic and that any weaker relation between ought and can licenses only a conclusion of a 
weaker kind of priority. However, this is an error. Ought implies can is sufficient, but it is not 
necessary, to conclude the logical priority of the epistemic.  
What depends on the strength of the relation between ought and deliberately can is the 
determinacy of the set of potential obligations, not the logical order in which epistemic and other 
factors must be considered. Given some subject S, there is S’s set of “deliberately can-dos,” i.e., 
all of those options that S can realize on the basis of her knowledge and learning capacity, 
without need for the intervention of luck, fortune, or any other spontaneous forces. The stronger 
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the relation between ought and deliberately can, the more the set of potential obligations 
approximates the set of “deliberately can-dos.” However, if the relation between ought and 
deliberately can is something weaker, say, makes plausible, then the set of potential obligations 
is less determinate. It becomes less clear whether any particular member of S’s “deliberately can-
dos” is also a member of the set of S’s potential obligations. For example, if makes plausible is 
the right relation between ought and deliberately can, then whether some option O is a member 
of the set of S’s potential obligations depends on how plausible it is that S deliberately can do O. 
O is more likely to be a member of the set of S’s potential obligations the more plausible it is that 
S deliberately can do O. If it is definitely plausible that S deliberately can do O, then O is 
definitely a member of the set of S’s potential obligations. However, if it is utterly implausible 
that S deliberately can do O, then O is not a member of the set of S’s potential obligations. 
Note that insofar as S can evaluate the extent to which she deliberately can do something, 
even an extremely weak principle like ought makes plausible deliberately can remains a 
practically useful maxim for S. So, the greater indeterminacy of potential obligations that follows 
if the appropriate relation between ought and deliberately can is relatively weak does not threaten 
that part of our argument that hinges on the assumption that some such principle is practically 
useful.  
If this line of reasoning is sound, then epistemic considerations are logically prior to 
moral, prudential, and pecuniary considerations. In effect, whatever is the correct statement of 
the logical relation between ought and can, if it is to be a practically useful principle of practical 
action, then “can” must mean deliberately can, which means knows enough (that and how) to, 
and one’s potential moral, prudential, and pecuniary oughts are determined by one’s epistemic 
burdens. In order to make a moral, prudential, or economic decision, some epistemic work must 
be done. The epistemic is logically prior to other non-epistemic normative considerations.  
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Implications of the Priority of the Epistemic 
 
If either of our arguments is sound, then epistemic considerations are logically prior to moral, 
prudential, pecuniary, and other (non-epistemic) normative considerations. The set of a person’s 
potential obligations is determined by the nature and extent of their ignorance. If this is right, 
then it seems either false or simply empty to insist that an actor ought to do something that, 
because she pre-consciously takes herself to be incapable of realizing it on the basis of her 
existing knowledge and learning capacity, will never appear to her as an option, or appear only 
as deeply discounted. At least, a person would seem to be tilting at windmills who attributes an 
obligation to someone whose cognitive architecture and experiential history is such that the 
purportedly obligated course of action will either not appear among her options or appear only as 
severely discounted relative to other options.  
Bo Jackson may know (or may have known in his younger, more athletic, days) how to 
climb a ten-foot wall to steal a home run or how to trample opposing linebackers, but if he does 
not know how to save a child from drowning in a shallow pond, then it is either false or 
meaningless to assert that he ought to save the drowning child. Bo’s potential obligations are 
determined by his relative epistemic burdens and if (ex hypothesi) his relative epistemic burdens 
are such that trying to save the drowning child does not appear to him as an option, it makes little 
sense to assert that he has a moral obligation to try or that he is immoral for not trying to save the 
child. Singer’s (1972) case is compelling in large part because it strains credulity to think that a 
typical adult, much less Bo Jackson, would be ignorant of how to perform this act. But, place the 
child in deeper water and take away Bo’s swimming know-how, and it becomes more difficult to 
see the sense in the assertion that he is morally obligated to try to save the child.  
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Or consider the CEO whose shareholders demand profits, but who runs a company in a 
dying industry (say, print news media). The CEO is ignorant of how to achieve the demanded 
profits, because they are impossible to achieve under prevailing market conditions. Again, the 
standard notion that CEOs are obligated to try to make profits for their shareholders is, under 
such circumstances, either false or meaningless. Something similar can be said about 
policymakers, who, like CEOs, are a kind of surrogate decision-maker (Scheall 2019). 
Policymakers’ constituents may (indeed, perhaps often) demand of them impossible tasks, or 
tasks the realization of which require a well of knowledge deeper, or learning capacities more 
expansive, than the policymaker possesses. The policymaker whose constituents demand things 
that the policymaker cannot deliberately achieve is under no obligation to attempt to meet these 
demands.  
Many failings that seem at first glance to be of a moral, prudential, or economic nature, 
are primarily epistemic. The imaginary Bo Jackson who is so ignorant that he cannot deliberately 
save a child drowning in a shallow pond fails for entirely epistemic reasons, and not at all 
because he is morally, prudentially, or economically deficient.  
One might be inclined to argue of such a case that Bo “should have known” enough to 
deliberately save the child. That is, Bo should have taken the steps necessary to possess the 
required knowledge. Moreover, such an argument might be thought to undermine the logical 
priority of the epistemic, i.e., if there are things that one should know, such considerations must 
be prior to questions of what the actor does know. However, if our position is sound, such 
“should have known” claims merely push the priority of the epistemic to a higher order. On our 
way of thinking, whether Bo should have taken the steps necessary to possess the knowledge 
required to save the drowning child hinges crucially on whether he deliberately can have taken 
the necessary steps. If Bo’s epistemic burdens were such that taking these steps did not appear to 
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him as an option – perhaps because he was ignorant of the practice known as swimming or of the 
possibility that human beings can drown in water – then it is either false or simply meaningless 
to assert that Bo “should have known” enough to deliberately save the child. Potential epistemic 
obligations are not determined by non-epistemic considerations but by higher-order epistemic 
considerations, i.e., not by the limits of what the actor deliberately can do, but by the limits of 
what the actor deliberately can know. It is potentially true that an actor “should have known” 
only those things that she deliberately can have known.  
Consider the following example from Sanford Goldberg (2017, p. 2889): 
 
SOCIAL WORKER: S is a very overworked social worker, whose case load is more than 
150 (typical for the underresourced Department of Family Services in her state). It comes 
to pass that one of the foster children in S’s caseload suffers a tragic—and, it is deemed, 
preventable—death. People clamor that S should have known that the child was at serious 
risk! But when the facts come to light, it becomes clear that there was no reasonable way 
S could have known this, given the way that DFS organized itself on its underresourced 
budget. And it becomes clear as well that there was no reasonable restructuring of DFS 
itself, consistent with its level of funding and the totality of its responsibilities, that would 
have made it so that S would have been in a position to know.  
 
Goldberg thinks this is a case in which S should have known that the child was in danger. On our 
analysis, however, S should have known only if S deliberately can have known that the child was 
in danger, and it does not seem as if this was an option for S. One might be tempted to say that S 
could have made such a discovery and we would agree that, surely, S could have accidentally or 
fortunately, or luckily, discovered that the child was in danger. But, given the description of the 
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case, it does not seem as though S deliberately can have discovered that the child was in grave 
danger. Given S’s caseload and the structure of the DFS organization, she cannot have 
deliberately gone through each case and assessed each child’s risk. There was simply too much 
work. The only way that S can have made such a discovery was if she had luckily guessed that 
the child was in danger or randomly picked the child’s file for review. S could only have made 
such a discovery with luck or by accident. Given this, it does not seem that the child’s 
susceptibility was something that S should have known. Goldberg’s claim that S should have 
known is in error. If anyone failed to satisfy their obligations, it was not S, but the government 
for which she works, which – assuming its officials deliberately can have organized the DFS in a 
way that would have facilitated S’s knowledge of the child’s risk and, thus, presumably 
prevented the child’s death – had a potential obligation to organize the DFS in the way required 
to prevent the child’s death and, presumably the deaths of still other children.  
 Or consider another of Goldberg’s examples (p. 2887): 
  
BASEBALL Jones has just begun to play baseball. Given the lack of players in his high 
school, he made the team as a back-up. After the seasoned third- baseman gets injured 
just before the start of the high school season, Jones is asked to play third base in the 
season’s first game. Consequently, he has little time to practice and to get to know the 
game. The result is that he doesn’t learn some of the game’s less familiar rules. For 
example, he isn’t taught that a hit ball is still in play if it hits the third base bag. As a 
result of a play in which this happens at a crucial moment in the first game of the season, 
he lets the winning run score. Fans are furious, and are not mollified by his pleading 
ignorance: how could he have failed to know this? He’s a ballplayer after all, he should 
have known! When the fans find out that he is new to the game, however, they no longer 
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blame him, but instead re-direct their anger at the manager, Ralphie Schneck: why hadn’t 
Ralphie made Jones aware of this?!? 
 
Like the case of the social worker, unless Jones deliberately can have known about the rule, it is 
difficult to see why he should have known. His only possible source of knowledge of the rule 
was his coach, Ralphie. Jones cannot deliberately have known about the rule, so, on our analysis, 
it is not true that he should have known. However, our analysis also implies that, given the way 
the example is set up, Ralphie had no obligation to inform Jones of the relevant rule. Surely, 
given enough time before Jones’s first big game, Ralphie deliberately can have informed Jones 
of the rule and this would have thus been one of Ralphie’s potential obligations. With enough 
time to spare, Ralphie deliberately can have provided Jones with a comprehensive set of the rules 
of baseball and walked him through various game situations, including the relatively uncommon 
one covered by the rule. However, the example makes it seem like Ralphie simply did not have 
time for such deliberate training. He could have informed Jones only luckily or accidentally, i.e., 
only if, as in the social worker case above, he had simply guessed that the rule would be relevant 
to the game or randomly selected it for Jones’s pre-game edification.  
The logical priority of the epistemic implies that much opprobrium of an ostensibly 
moral, prudential, or economic nature is misplaced, and that what such misconceived expressions 
of disapproval actually express is a wish that the epistemic circumstances of the person criticized 
were different than they in fact are.  
 
Further Potential Objections and Counterexamples 
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We conceive of decision-making as proceeding in the following (logical) order: first, the actor’s 
ignorance pre-consciously sets brackets around options that the actor knows enough to 
deliberately achieve and ranks these options in accordance with their relative epistemic burdens 
for the actor. Then – second – the actor considers and chooses from the remaining options in 
accordance with relevant moral, prudential, pecuniary, and any other pertinent considerations. 
The epistemic is logically prior to these other non-epistemic normative considerations. Epistemic 
burdens – the nature and extent of one’s ignorance with respect to courses of action – determine 
what counts as a potential obligation.  
 We discussed above what would constitute a counterexample to our first argument. It 
remains merely to consider what would qualify as a counterexample to our second argument, 
according to which the logical priority of the epistemic follows from the fact that some principle 
like ought implies can is true and useful, and the argument that, in order to be useful, the word 
“can” in such principles must mean deliberately can, which means knows enough (that and how) 
to.  
 One possible counter to this second argument is to reject any and all principles like ought 
implies can, and insist that there is no relation whatsoever between ought and can.9 Someone 
who insists that there is no relation between ought and can will eventually find themselves 
asserting plainly impossible obligations. As above, it is difficult to know how one might respond 
to a merely imaginary counterexample, but given the general contours as just stated of such a 
counterexample, it is interesting to consider how one might respond to the assertion that they are 
                                                        
9 We remind the reader again that, other than accepting that some relation obtains between ought 
and can, we take no stance on the exact nature of this relation. Thus, arguments against ought 
implies can or against any other specific version of this principle are impotent against us.  
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obligated do something that, for whatever reason, they simply cannot do, deliberately or even 
with a healthy heaping of spontaneity. It is even more interesting to consider how one who 
denies any connection between ought and can would react to the assertion of themselves that 
they are obligated to do something that they cannot do. It is typically easier to be the person 
moralizing than the person obligated. We suspect that someone who claims of another person 
that they are obligated to do something that they cannot do would be more comfortable as the 
person moralizing than as the person obligated. It is simple to claim that there is no connection 
whatsoever between ought and can. It is much harder to live one’s life in accordance with this 
notion.   
 Alternatively, one might argue that our analysis of the meaning of the word “can” in 
principles like ought implies can is faulty and that “can” need not mean deliberately can, in order 
for such principles to be true and practically useful. Unless one is prepared, as above, to simply 
deny the truth and usefulness of such principles, this would seem to require establishing that 
another candidate meaning of “can” renders some such principle practically useful, and, 
moreover, arguing that this meaning is more likely to be true than a similar principle that invokes 
deliberately can as the meaning of “can.”  
 Or, one might accept our argument that the meaning of “can” in such principles is 
deliberately can, but reject the notion that “deliberately can” means knows enough to. However, 
this would seem to require arguing that there is no connection between a person’s knowledge and 
the things that she deliberately can do. If there is any such connection – if, say, “deliberately 
can” does not mean knows enough to, but rather, it is the case that being able to deliberately do 
something merely makes it likely that the actor knows enough to realize the option in question, 
our argument for the logical priority of the epistemic still stands. Under such circumstances, it 
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remains the case that having moral, prudential, or pecuniary obligations requires some epistemic 
work and that one’s epistemic burdens are a necessary determinant of these obligations.   
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